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Fake News and Filter Bubbles: America’s Spiral of Extremism
Davis Drover

Just two weeks after his inauguration, President Donald Trump declared on Twitter
that “any negative polls are fake news,” assuring his supporters that opposition to
his presidency did not exist. He used the term “fake news,” defined as information
and news that are presented as true but have no basis in reality, throughout the
United States presidential election campaign of 2016. Fake news is usually created
for the purpose of misleading readers (Allcott & Gentzkow 214). Satirical news,
which differs from fake news in that its intention is not to deceive but to entertain,
can often have the same consequences as fake news, as people often share articles
on social media without reading them first (Gabielkov et al. 5). Furthermore, the
Pew Research Center found that two-thirds of Americans get news from social
media at least some of the time, with 20% of Americans doing so often (Shearer
and Gottfried 2). Confirmation bias inherent in the process of producing personalized news feeds creates a fragmented reality; if facts cannot be agreed upon, how
is compromise possible? Confirmation bias on social media is enforced through
algorithms on sites such as Facebook and Twitter and often means that almost
everything a user sees on their feed simply reinforces what they already believe
to be true, leading them to think almost no one disagrees (Sunstein 3). Moreover,
because social media has no borders, it is crucial to consider the harmful effects it
has on democracy both within the United States and globally. The implications are
grave: extremism and eroding trust in democracy, which causes people to become
even more vulnerable to fake news. The recent trend of distrust towards mainstream media as well as echo chambers created by filter bubbles is causing the
disappearance of the political centre and is sending the American political system
into a spiral of extremism.
American politics have never been more polarizing or partisan, as demonstrated by examining the distribution of political ideologies within the Democratic
and Republican parties. Data from the Pew Research Center shows that the American political spectrum has never been more divided since the think tank began
surveys in 1994. Twenty-three years ago the median Republican was more conservative than 64% of Democrats, but in 2017 the median Republican was more
conservative than 95% of Democrats. Likewise, 97% of Democrats are more to the
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left on the political spectrum than the median Republican (Pew Research Center
12). The left wing has moved left while the right wing has moved to the right. A
widespread lack of political disagreement is impossible and even dangerous in
a country as big as the United States, but too much division stifles progress and
debate. A healthy democracy would be one to strike a balance.
Social media is counterproductive to the goal of striking this balance,
because social media favours extremism by design; driven by advertising revenue,
online platforms quickly turn to increasingly shocking content. Media influences
public opinion and thus the more extreme the news is, the more extreme people’s
views will be. To help unpack how political discussion on social media turns to
extremism, the example of sharing food images online as discussed by Robert
Kozinets will be examined. Kozinets is a professor at the University of Southern
California and expert in the field of netnography, which is the study of social interaction in online environments. He uses the popularity of sharing images of food
on social media as an example to prove how the Internet quickly favours extremism (Kozinets). Social media’s competition for clicks, which directly translate to
advertising revenue for websites, drives online one-upmanship. This is why “the
most popular food porn images depict massive hamburgers that [are] impossible
to eat, dripping with bacon grease, gummy worms and sparklers” (Kozinets). Fake
news tends to be sensationalist and extreme also because that is what generates
clicks and views. The most effective way to go viral is to turn to the extreme, and
just as social media creates extremism in pictures of food, it does so in political
discussion. The advantage fake news has over real news is that it is not constrained
by reality, just as unrealistic food porn is not constrained by what is possible to eat.
Evidence shows that online communities are mostly self-contained and
users tend to form groups based on ideologies. The term filter bubble is used to
describe the intellectual isolation that results from social media algorithms making
assumptions on what users want to see based on browsing history, location, and
former click behaviour (Technopedia). Algorithms are not alone in the creation of
filter bubbles, however; users who aim to shield themselves from views contrary
to their own can also intentionally produce them. A statistic that demonstrates
this is the fact that 78% of users in an anonymous Internet activity study were
found to get a majority of their news from one publication (Flaxman et al. 313).
Furthermore, when researchers in an Association for Psychological Science study
estimated the ideological positions of almost four million Twitter users and examined almost 150 million tweets, it was found that “information was exchanged
primarily among individuals with similar ideological preferences” (Barberá et al.
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1539). This proves that filter bubbles, or echo chambers as they are also called,
are indeed real, at least for political news—the researchers did not find the same
bubbles for non-political news events like the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing
or 2014 Super Bowl (Barberá et al. 1537). Discussion within ideological groups
causes a phenomenon called group polarization, which occurs, in part, by individuals adjusting their opinions “in the direction of the dominant position so as to be
favourably perceived by those with whom they interact” (Holbrook 757). Accordingly, online political discussion is often polarized with most users unknowingly
placing themselves into the “left-wing bubble” or the “right-wing bubble.”
Filter bubbles create divergence on the political spectrum and further the
divide between the left and the right. Evidence shows that regardless of the type
of media consumed, filter bubbles—which are not confined to social media—
increase polarization. A 2010 study published in the Journal of Communication
found that people who were exposed to media that presented perspectives in
opposition to their beliefs had lower levels of extremism in their political opinions (Stroud 566). Based on this research, it appears that the media one consumes
shapes political beliefs; however, it could also be argued that one’s political beliefs
determine the media one consumes. In reality, both are likely at play and a sort of
feedback loop could be created. This feedback loop can be described as a “spiral
of attitudinal reinforcement” (Borgesius et al. 4). This spiral is the mechanism that
causes extremism. With the advent of the Internet, it may appear on the surface
that people are now choosing what they are exposed to, whereas in an earlier era
one would frequently be exposed to news not chosen in advance in mediums such
as newspapers and television (Sunstein, qtd. in Holbrook 754). However, online
users are, like pre-Internet consumers were, frequently exposed to media they did
not choose in advance, only now it is an algorithm that is doing the choosing.
Social media gives less choice in media content while giving the illusion of more.
Although scholars like Sunstein stress the importance of serendipity in media consumption and argue it promotes individual liberty (#Republic 5), the ability for the
Internet to provide personalized content based on user preferences contributes to
ideological bubbles (Flaxman et al. 313). Ultimately, both the user selectivity and
algorithmic personalization enabled by the Internet has allowed users to consume
media that rarely, if ever, challenges their already held beliefs.
If the facts cannot be agreed upon, how can compromise occur? A healthy
democracy relies on shared experiences (Sunstein, qtd. in Holbrook 754), exposure
to the same information, and general agreement on what is true and what is not.
Using this shared reality, people across the political spectrum can take the agreedPublished by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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upon facts and come to their own conclusions. Otherwise, as it currently stands,
everyone is receiving different information online that confirms their already held
beliefs. Two people cannot debate about how to solve a problem if they do not
agree on the facts that it rests on. Without shared experiences in a society, people
will struggle to understand each other, resulting in a much harder time addressing
social issues (Sunstein qtd. in Holbrook 754).
The filter bubbles that Facebook and other social media websites create for
their users continue to exist because they are profitable. Facebook has algorithms
in place to increase user participation, and users are more likely to participate on
posts they agree with (Holbrook 757). Media has been shown to influence elections
and, therefore, fake news masquerading as the truth will too. An analysis of Facebook engagements—comments, shares, and likes—revealed that fake news articles got more attention online than mainstream news between August and November of 2016 (Silverman; Alcott and Gentzkow 212). Mainstream news totalled
only 7.3 million engagements, while fake news garnered 8.7 million engagements
(Silverman, 2016). Therefore, it can stand to reason that a considerable amount
of Facebook’s user engagement and, in turn, income is generated from fake news
posted on the site.
Facebook’s vested interest in the proliferation of fake news would explain
CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s attempts to discredit the idea that fake news had any
influence in the United States presidential election of 2016. Speaking at a conference two days after the election, Zuckerberg said that “the idea that fake news
on Facebook … influenced the election in any way, I think is a pretty crazy idea.
Voters make decisions based on their lived experience” (Chafkin and Frier). As
indicated by the studies above, Zuckerberg’s claims are misleading; in fact, social
media and news consumption play a crucial role in shaping political ideas held
by voters. Suggesting that news does not influence elections is both naive and
irresponsible. Facebook is the largest social media website in the world by far,
with 2 billion monthly active users (Constine). This also makes it the largest news
network, with greater possible influence than any mainstream news outlet.
But how much influence does the news have on voting behaviour? Does
the media sway voters? Or do voters make decisions solely based on lived experiences? The political and media landscape of Russia in 1999 provides an opportunity to examine the effect of media exposure on voting behaviour. This is because
during the 1999 election period, many regions in Russia had access only to government-controlled television (Enikolopov et al. 3253). A study analyzing this
parliamentary election found that taking into account all other characteristics, the
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presence of the only national television channel independent of the government
decreased the aggregate vote for the government party by a margin of 8.9% (Enikolopov et al. 3269). The researchers concluded that those who used alternative
sources of information for their political news were more difficult to persuade.
Thus, it can be reasoned that those who do not use alternative sources of information—those stuck in a bubble—are easier to persuade. In a political and media
landscape characterized by fake news, this susceptibility to persuasion and lack
of critical thought about the media one consumes becomes more problematic
than ever. Fake news, unconstrained by the limits of reality, is often located at the
extreme ends of the political spectrum. Because of the ability of filter bubbles to
limit exposure to opposing viewpoints, those who are in them are at high risk for
adopting extreme views and being easily persuaded. In this way, filter bubbles,
although not the sole cause, contribute to the recent trend of extremism.
Over time, corrections to falsely held beliefs have no effect on people isolated in ideological bubbles. This is called the backfire effect, and it is responsible
for reinforcing the extremism that such bubbles create. The backfire effect occurs
when people are presented with counter-evidence to their falsely held beliefs and
instead of changing their view, the counter-evidence strengthens their misunderstood world view (Economist Intelligence). This occurs because the human brain
processes emotional threats, such as exposure to an opposing view, the same way it
does physical threats (Kaplan et al. 8). The brain acts as if exposure to the conflicting information is a genuine threat to safety and, accordingly, acts to protect itself.
An example that illustrates the backfire effect is the relationship between believing
false claims made by a president and supporting that president.
Specifically, belief in the falsehood that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction before the United States invaded and began the Iraq War in 2003 has been
firmly correlated with support for Republican president George W. Bush (Kull et
al. 569). A Dartmouth College study found that while liberals who had seen articles
correcting the misconception were more likely to disagree with the false claim,
conservatives who also saw the corrections were even more convinced Iraq had
such weapons (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). The study also tested misconceptions
that liberals were prone to believe, to balance the findings on commitment by conservatives to a conservative president, but the effect was not as strong. Although
this study alone is not sufficient to make a generalized claim, it does suggest that
conservatives may be more susceptible to the backfire effect. This can be linked to
the rise of Donald Trump as a political leader, where mainstream media’s attempts
to debunk his numerous lies could have strengthened support amongst followers
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2018
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and, ultimately, helped get him elected. In contrast to the aforementioned study,
an experiment conducted with help from the European Research Council concluded that showing Trump supporters corrections to misleading statements he
made actually did reduce misconceptions (Nyhan et al. 1). However, support for
Donald Trump was unaffected by these corrections, and Trump supporters considered news articles that reported on a false statement by Donald Trump to be less
accurate and fair when accompanied by a correction. In contrast, Clinton supporters considered the same articles to be more accurate with a correction (Nyhan et
al. 13). Generally speaking, correcting falsehoods either strengthens supporters’
belief in those falsehoods or has no affect on supporters’ perceptions.
Trust in the mainstream media is at an all-time low. Gallup Polls stretching
back half a century show a steady decline in the percentage of Americans who trust
mass media. Seventy-two per cent of Americans had trust in mainstream media in
1976, but by 2016 this has dropped to only 32% (Swift). This distrust has been further exacerbated by Donald Trump’s characterization of mainstream media publications as the enemy. In fact, trust in mainstream media amongst Republicans
plummeted from 32% to 14% in just one year (Swift), with a vast majority believing that mainstream media publishes a significant amount of fake news (Easley).
With less trust in mainstream media, people are turning to partisan Internet sites
for their news, and, as discussed prior, shared experiences and exposure to the
same information are important for a healthy democracy. Trust in the media is a
key part to achieving this.
Weaker democracies, which are characterized by an eroding confidence in
the government and institutions like elections (Economist Intelligence 44), lead
to greater susceptibility to media persuasion, as seen when comparing an illiberal
democracy like Russia to a relatively liberal democracy like the United States
(Enikolopov et al. 3269). Illiberal democracies still have freedom of the press
and elections—of course not without voter suppression—but the civil rights of
the citizens can be taken away at a moment’s notice (Milanovik). As mentioned
above, the only non-government television channel during the Russian parliamentary elections of 1999 decreased the aggregate vote for the government party by
a margin of 8.9% (Enikolopov et al. 3269). A similar study was conducted in the
United States. The Fox News effect is the name for the anticipated outcome of
the availability of Fox News on Republicans’ vote shares in the election of 2000.
The study that formulated the term observed that “Republicans gain[ed] 0.4 to 0.7
percentage points in the [9,256] towns which broadcast Fox News” (DellaVigna
and Kaplan 2). Partisan media had a significantly higher impact on voting trends in
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Russia than the United States during approximately the same period. This supports
the hypothesis proposed in Enikolopov et al. that weaker democratic institutions
correlate with greater susceptibility to media persuasion. If traditional media can
have such a significant impact, it can be deducted that social media will as well.
Therefore, the current erosion of trust in democratic institutions, intensified by
filter bubbles, increases social media’s ability to persuade users and drive political
extremism.
In conclusion, if shared experiences and the ability to empathize and understand one another’s opinions are key to a healthy democracy, then democracy is
currently suffering. In addition, it is key for the free press to be trusted by citizens
to deliver the truth on the actions of government. Ideological bubbles, fake news,
and social media are weakening democracy by causing people to shift from the
centre to the extremes of the political spectrum. This results in fewer shared experiences, because people on different sides of the spectrum are exposed to drastically different content online. By analyzing media influence in Russia as well as
the United States, one can argue that the strength or weakness of democratic institutions has a direct effect on the magnitude of media persuasion. Online filter bubbles erode democracy, which in turn amplifies the magnitude of media persuasion
and gives more influence to the already powerful trend of fake news. The influence
of fake news will further polarize the masses, further undermine democracy, and
the people will be even more susceptible to it. In this way, a positive feedback loop
is created, otherwise known as a spiral of extremism. This trend is an out-of-control positive feedback loop and, like a snowball rolling down a hill, will only get
bigger before it can be stopped.
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